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Appellant, Rhoda Lee Lewis, respectfully requests that the
Court grant a rehearing on its decision in this case filed on
May 13, 1987 on the sole basis that the Court erred in ruling
that the will did not create an imperative power of appointment.

ARGUMENT

The Supreme Court's decision rejects Mrs. Lewis' argument
that her husband created a special imperative power of
appointment in his 1971 will with Ben Lewis, the personal
representative of the estate, as the donee, and Mrs. Lewis as
the sole beneficiary of the power.

The basis of the Court's

decision is that the words chosen by the decedent are precatory
and not imperative.

Court's Decision, at 6.

"Precatory words" are words of "request, desire, wish or
recommendation . . . as distinguished from direct and
imperative terms."

Black's Law Dictionary, "Precatory Words",

West Publishing (4th Ed. 1972).

Mrs. Lewis's husband did not

say "please consider" but rather "Insure for her . . . fair
portion.

There are more than ample funds, chattels and

tangibles to provide this."

"Insure," in the context of this

sentence, means "to make certain especially by taking necessary
measures and precautions" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
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(G. & C. Merriam Company 1977)) and "to make sure, to
guarantee, as, to insure safety to any one."

Black's Law

Dictionary, "Insure", West Publishing (4th Ed. 1972).

The word

"insure" is imperative, not precatory.
Moreover, while the Court recognized that George Lewis'
will "should be read and understood as a whole, and meaning
given to all of its provisions considered in their relationship
to each other," (Court's Decision, p. 6), the Court reached its
decision that the "words do not express an intention to bestow
upon another the power to dispose of identified property"
without considering the relationship between the "insure"
clause and the last sentence of paragraph one.

Court's

Decision, at 5. George Lewis intended for his personal
representative "to insure [Mrs. Lewis's] . . . fair portion" of
the estate by distributing at least some of the "more than
ample funds, chattels and tangibles to provide this."
Consider:

if the personal representative had decided to

fulfill this direction in the will (whether precatory or not),
the only way he could do so would be by distributing assets to
Mrs. Lewis.

As personal representative, he did not have the

authority or power to do anything else.
In addition, the Court failed to consider the similar
language used by George Lewis in his 1969 Will.
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-First — Through investment, trust/ affiliated funds
and/or other I charge that a sufficient income be assured
for my wife Rhoda — one that will provide security without
the worry of management problems of liquidation, transfer
disposal, etc. Full comfort and security.
(R.206).

This language is very similar to the language Mr.

Lewis chose in his 1971 Will.

The use of the words MI charge,"

M

assure- and wincome- require distributions; those words are

not -precatory words.-

The district court ruled that the 1969

Will could be used as evidence of George Lewis' intent in
executing his 1971 Will.

The 1969 Will establishes that George

Lewis was mandating in his 1971 Will that distributions be made
from his estate for Mrs. Lewis's benefit.
Thus, the distinction that the Court draws in its decision
between the language in this case and those of other cases
where imperative powers have been found is a distinction
without any logical substance.

George Lewis created an

imperative special power of appointment by his will, and the
Court should so hold.
The Court's decision appears to be based on the fact that
Mrs. Lewis will still receive a portion of her husband's estate
as one of his intestate heirs.

Footnote 13 of the Court's

opinion distinguishes the Rowland decision (In Re Rowlands'
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Estate, 73 Ariz. 337, 241 P.2d 781 (1952)) on the basis that
the Rowland estate would escheat absent a finding of an
imperative power of appointment.

The implication of this

footnote and other statements by the Court is that the Court
can reject an otherwise reasonable interpretation of a
decedent's will if the proponent of the will is entitled to
other benefits from the estate.

This is contrary to prior Utah

law as well as the law of every other jurisdiction.

"Based on

the presumption against intestacy, the courts will adopt any
reasonable construction to avoid a conclusion of intestacy."
Matter of Estate of Gardner, 615 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980);
emphasis added.

See also, 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1133 (1975);

Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 325, 328 (1965).
Mrs. Lewis appreciates the reasons that motivated the Court
to conclude that she should only receive a portion and not all
of her husband's estate.

But in reaching that result, the

Court has trampled over well and long established rules and has
obliterated any recognizable distinction between precatory and
imperative words.

The Court should recognize that the contrary

result, that Mrs. Lewis receive the entire estate, is not
offensive to either the law or public policy.

Since 1977, a

widow in Mrs. Lewis's circumstances would be the sole heir of
the estate.

And while it is easy to say her husband only
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intended Mrs. Lewis to receive a "fair portion" of the estate,
it is also true that he did not intend anyone else to share in
his estate whatsoever.

Indeed, what is more offensive:

That

the decedent's wife of 30 years receive the entire estate when
the decedent specified "insure . . . her fair portion?"

Or

that the decedent's collateral relatives should receive some of
the estate when they are not named in the will at all?

The

Court has rejected a reasonable interpretation of George Lewis'
will with numerous precedents in order to preclude Mrs. Lewis
from receiving her late husband's entire estate.

Under the

facts of this case, the Court's decision establishes an ill
advised and unfortunate precedent.
Mrs. Lewis respectfully requests a rehearing on the sole
issue of whether her husband's will created an imperative power
of appointment.
Dated May ^uL9 1987.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

/CA^OU, / ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^
Charles M. Bennett
Attorneys for Appellant
Rhoda Lee Lewis
CERTIFICATION
As counsel for the Rhoda Lee Lewis, I certify that this
petition for rehearing is presented in good faith and not for
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the purpose of delay.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN

^^u^

»EBEKER

/^t/^JZZf

Charles M. Bennett
CDN5737B
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